Philosophy of mind; “The mark of the mental”.
Some philosophers have thought that there is an epistemological mark of the mental—i.e., mental states are distinguished from non-mental states by being known in a different way from non-mental states, or by being known better than non-mental states are known. Is this a defensible view? Is there an epistemological mark of the mental? A variety of proposals have been made: that the mental is or can be known directly, the non-mental only indirectly; that the mental is or can be known directly by the subject, the non-mental not so; that we are infallible with respect to mental states; that we are incorrigible with respect to mental states; that we are omniscient about mental states; that mental states are self-warranting in the sense that merely being in the states is enough to make you prima facie justified in believing that you are in the states. You need not review all these options. Rather, select the ones you regard as most promising and subject them to scrutiny. Are any of these proposal defensible, and which is the best proposal? (Kim, chapter 1; William Alston, “Varieties of Privileged Access,” American Philosophical Quarterly 1972)
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